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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen, Idec.
1
 
and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar
2
 have created an intra-circuit split regarding 
the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s “safe harbor” provision.  The safe harbor protects generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from patent infringement claims by the brand-name 
pharmaceutical patent holder if the patented techniques are used for required submissions to the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), usually to obtain FDA approval.  In the past, the issue 
with interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision has been exclusively related to pre-
market approval activities.  These two cases address whether the safe harbor extends to activities 
after the drug has been approved.  The panels deciding the two cases used different reasoning 
and ultimately came to two different conclusions; Classen uses the legislative history of the 
statute to interpret the scope of the safe harbor provision to exclude post-FDA-approval methods, 
while Momenta uses only the statutory text to interpret the statute to conclude that the scope of 
the safe harbor does include post-FDA-approval methods.  These conflicting decisions have 
created uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry and the issue needs to be resolved.   
                                                            
1 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
2 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
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This Comment will discuss the potential negative impact that the uncertainty of the safe 
harbor’s scope will have on the pharmaceutical industry.  Part II of this Comment will detail the 
background of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor provision and how it influences the seemingly 
conflicting outcomes in Classen and Momenta.  Part III will then address the implications these 
decisions will have on the future of generic drugs and the uncertainty that they create in the 
industry, and it will also suggest possible long-term and temporary solutions to this uncertainty.  
Ultimately, this Comment will suggest that the best way to define the scope of the safe harbor 
provision is to have the legislature address the issue through statutory amendment to clarify its 
limits and specifically state whether it applies to post-approval activities.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Drug Approval Process and Patent Implications 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) regulates the manufacture, use, and 
sale of drugs.
3
  For a drug to enter the market, the FDCA requires that Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approve it by determining that it is safe and effective.
4
  For a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer to obtain this approval, it must submit a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”) to the FDA.5  This process requires multiple stages and usually takes many years to 
complete.  During the first stage, the preclinical stage, pharmaceutical sponsor tests the 
toxicology of the drug by performing synthesis and purification, as well as some limited testing 
on animals.
6
  This stage can take up to six or seven years.
7
  After the completion of the drug’s 
preclinical testing, the manufacturer moves ahead to the clinical stage, which requires an 
                                                            
3 21 U.S.C. 331, 355(a). 
4 Id. 
5 21 USCA §355. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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Investigative New Drug Application (“IND”), and three clinical phases.8  Phase I tests the safety 
of the drug by conducting clinical trials on healthy individuals; Phase II tests the safety, dosing, 
and efficacy through administering the drug to volunteers in the target population; and Phase III 
tests the safety, efficacy, and side effects of the drug.
9
  This stage is incredibly lengthy and spans 
between 6 and 11 years.  Once that is completed, the manufacturer submits the NDA.
10
  The 
NDA explains the results of the clinical trials and sets forth the ingredients of the new drug, how 
it is manufactured, and how it works.
11
  The FDA evaluates the drug safety, effectiveness, and 
labeling to determine whether it will be approved. Once the drug has obtained approval, it can be 
marketed with FDA regulated labeling.
12
  The entirety of this FDA approval process can take 
anywhere from eleven to fourteen years.
13
   
 The lengthy time period required for FDA approval creates implications for both brand-
name pharmaceutical manufacturers and generic manufacturers, and this is what the Hatch-
Waxman Act sought to fix.  Before Hatch-Waxman, the time necessary to obtain FDA approval 
consumed a large portion of the patent life of the brand-name drug, while the extent of time and 
money that a manufacturer had to invest to obtain approval was a huge disincentive to generic 
manufacturers.
14
  While the brand-name manufacturer holds the patent for the drug, generic 
companies are prohibited from selling the generic version on the market.  This gives the brand-
name drug company patent exclusivity of the drug for the life of the patent.  Brand-name 
manufacturers lost some of the exclusivity benefits from the patent because the process required 
                                                            
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 21 CFR §314. 
12 Id. 
13 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) 
14 Karbalai, Hasneen, THE HATCH-WAXMAN (IM)BALANCING. ACT, Harvard LEDA, 28 (2003). 
 
 4 
the manufacturers to conduct lengthy clinical trials and await regulatory review before being able 
to place the drug on the market.  This long process cut significantly into the limited term of the 
patent, and the patentee drug manufacturers “were unable to profit from their invention’s market 
exclusivity…limiting the economic advantage the patentees could derive from their temporary 
monopoly.”15  On the other end, there was little incentive for manufacturers to develop generic 
drugs.
16
  This lengthy FDA approval process created economic disadvantages for both the brand-
name and generic manufacturers, highlighting the intersection between patent law and FDA 
regulation in this context. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers regularly seek patents for both their new and generic drug 
products.  A patent gives the holder the “right to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
offering for sale, or importing the patented invention for the term of the patent.”17  This gives 
pharmaceutical companies incentive to invest in researching and developing new products.  35 
U.S.C. 271(a) states that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”18  However, the 
Drug Price Competition on Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, or 35 U.S.C. § 271, creates an 
exemption to this rule of infringement.  The Act was enacted to amend the FDCA to address “the 
need for innovative new pharmaceuticals and the availability of less expensive generic drugs.”19  
The act facilitates generic entry in the pharmaceutical market by making it easier for 
manufacturers to obtain FDA approval in a shorter period of time.
20
  Prior to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the generic market was neither prevalent nor profitable.  The generic drug company was 
                                                            
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 35 U.S.C. 154. 
18 35 U.S.C. 271(a) 
19 Schacht, Wendy H. & John R. Thomas, The “Hatch-Waxman” Act: Select Patent-Related Issues; Congressional 
Research Service (2002). 
20 Id. 
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required to submit an NDA with results of studies conducted to show the safety and effectiveness 
of the drug, even though the brand-name drug manufacturer already submitted safety and 
effectiveness studies.
21
  The extensive time and costs required for generic drug manufacturers to 
gain FDA approval made it unlikely that the manufacturer would not recover its investment.  
This was a huge disincentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to invest in developing generic 
drugs.
22
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roche 
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., which prevented competitors from performing tests 
required for FDA approval using patented methods until those patents expired.
23
  This result 
prevented generic manufacturers from beginning testing on the drug until the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent expired, which “resulted in the generic not being able to obtain FDA 
approval until about two years following the expiration of the brand innovator’s patent.”24  
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman to overrule Roche.
25
  Title I of 35 U.S.C. § 271 sets out the 
procedure for the Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”). This abbreviated procedure 
allows the generic to take advantage of the brand-name manufacturer’s lengthy clinical research 
procedures.  This speeds up the approval process for generic drugs, allowing them to enter the 
market much faster than if they had to go through the clinical research process that new drugs 
must complete, because they are now able to enter the market as soon as the patent expires.
26
   
                                                            
21 Behrendt, Kristen E.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS OR SURVIVAL OF THE 
FITTEST?, 57 Food & Drug L.J. 247 (2002). 
22 Id. at 249. 
23 733 F. 2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
24 Behrendt, Kristen E.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS OR SURVIVAL OF THE 
FITTEST?, 57 Food & Drug L.J. 247 (2002). 
25 Fox, Allan M. & Bennet, Alan R., The Legislative History of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, Food and Drug Law Institute, Inc. (1987). 
26 Allan M. Fox & Allan R. Bennet, The Legislative History of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (FDLI 1987). 
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Section 505(j) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) addresses the 
abbreviated process for FDA approval of generic bioequivalent drugs.
27
  This provision allows 
manufacturers to file an ANDA, which rely on the original manufacturer’s safety and efficacy 
test results.  The provisions of the ADNA do not require the generic manufacturer to submit its 
own safety and effectiveness studies.  Instead, the manufacturer must submit information 
showing that the generic has the same active ingredients, dosage form, route of administration, 
and strength as the pioneer drug that the FDA has already approved.
28
  The ANDA also requires 
the generic manufacturer to show that the generic drug is bioequivalent to the approved drug.
29
  
If a generic manufacturer can show bioequivalence between the generic drug and the pioneer 
drug, the FDA can approve the drug without the proof of safety or efficacy required for NDAs.
30
  
A generic drug is bioequivalent if it contains the same active ingredient as the original.
31
  Under 
the ANDA procedure, a drug is “bioequivalent” if 
the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show significant difference from the 
rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug… or the extent of absorption of the drug 
does not show a significant difference from the extent of absorption of the listed drug… 
and the difference from the listed drug in the rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, 
is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective body 
drug concentrations on chronic use, and is considered medically insignificant for the 
drug.
32
   
Because an ANDA requires bioequivalency requirement rather than safety and efficacy tests that 
the NDA requires, the generic is able to receive FDA approval much faster.  The act attempts to 
balance the competing interests discussed above by extending the length of the patent term for 
brand-name manufacturers to restore some of the term that was lost due to clinical testing, while 
                                                            
27 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §505(j). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 21 USCA §355. 
32 25 Am. Jur. 2d Drugs and Controlled Substances §121. 
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allowing generic manufacturers to obtain FDA approval during the patent period (without being 
subject to infringement) and enter the market as soon as the patent expires.
33
  
The safe harbor provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that “[i]t shall not be an act 
of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the 
United States a patented invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products.”34  The language of the statute leaves room for 
ambiguity and interpretation of certain terms by the courts.  “The terms in the statutory language 
differ in certain respects from those in other provisions of the Act…  [s]everal words and phrases 
… raised several important questions that were left to the courts to determine.”35 Specifically, the 
terms “solely,” “reasonably related,” and “development and submission of information” have 
caused courts to contemplate how the statute should be interpreted. 
The legislative history of the Act gives some insight into the intended meaning of the 
statutory language.  The legislature strove to “restore patent terms to pharmaceutical inventions 
in order to offset the lengthy waiting period prior to receiving FDA pre-market approval to sell a 
new drug” and “permit generic companies to use the patented products in preparing their 
applications for similar regulatory approval before the patent terms expire so that brand 
companies cannot enjoy a longer monopoly than allowed by the patent statute.”36  Excerpts from 
the Congressional record indicate that the limited purpose of the safe harbor provision was to 
facilitate the generic drug application process to the FDA for approval.  During this process, the 
generic manufacturer must submit data to the FDA to establish bioequivalence, and “in order to 
                                                            
33 Id. 
34 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
35 Karbalai, Hasneen, THE HATCH-WAXMAN (IM)BALANCING. ACT, Harvard LEDA, 28 (2003). 
36 Wang, Chenwei, IN SEARCH OF THE BOUNDARY OF THE SAFE HARBOR, 19 Fed. Cir. B.J. 617 (2010). 
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complete this application the generic manufacturer must conduct certain drug tests.  In order to 
complete this type of testing, section 202 of the bill creates general exception to the rules of 
patent infringement. Thus, a generic manufacturer may obtain a supply of a patented drug 
product during the life of the patent and conduct tests using that product if the purpose of those 
tests is to submit an application for FDA approval.”37   
The legislative history suggests that the safe harbor is intended to allow for activities only 
in preparation for commercial activity.  Rep. Kastenmeier stated, in the House Floor Debate, that 
“[t]he purpose of sections 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that experimentation with a patented 
drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a 
valid patent expires, is not patent infringement.”38  The Legislature intended only minimal 
interference with a patent holder’s rights through application of this provision.  As stated in the 
House Report Part 2, “the only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of 
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute … 
thus, the nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”39  The 
Legislature had several concerns regarding the safe harbor provision during the process of 
enacting it, such as “[t]aking property rights away from people and away from companies” and 
“compromis[ing] the rights of present patent holders by permitting their adverse use of that 
particular product by potential competitors prior to the time that the patent expires.”40  There 
                                                            
37 Remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier, House Floor Debate, Cong. Rec. of August 8, 1984, at H8708 (emphasis added). 
38 Id. 
39 House Report Part 2, at pages 8-9. 
40 Remarks of Rep. DeWine, Hose Floor Debate, Cong. Rec. of August 8, 1984, at H8710; Remarks of Rep. 
Moorhead, House Floor Debate, Cong. Rec. of August 8, 1984, at H8710. 
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were also concerns that this leniency on patent infringement would contradict the United States’ 
position on the importance of patent rights.
41
  
C.  Past Supreme Court Interpretations of the “Safe Harbor” Provision 
The difficulty of interpreting the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is apparent through both 
the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s varying decisions.  There have been several recent 
Supreme Court cases that have addressed the interpretation of the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1)’s safe harbor provision, including Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. and Merck KgaA 
v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.  Both of these cases addressed pre-marketing approval 
mechanisms.
42
  In Eli Lilly, the Court interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to extend to medical 
devices as well as drugs, based on the plain language of the statute.
43
  Prior to making its way to 
the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit decided the case by using the legislative history to 
interpret the meaning of the statute.
44
  In contrast, the Supreme Court initially looked at the 
legislative history but ultimately disregarded it, reasoning that if the legislative intent was to 
single out drugs, “there were available infinitely more clear and simple ways of expressing that 
intent.”45    The decision broadened the scope of the safe harbor provision by holding that 
Section 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of patented inventions reasonably related to 
the development and submission of information needed to obtain marketing approval of medical 
devices under the FDCA.
46
   
                                                            
41 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
193 (2005). 
42 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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In Merck, the Supreme Court again broadened the scope of the safe harbor provision.  
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit majority (written by Judge Rader) 
argued that the legislative history and intent of the provision is clear, and interpreted the meaning 
of the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related…” narrowly by focusing on the word “solely.”47  
The Supreme Court, instead of focusing its attention on the word “solely,” gave a broad 
interpretation to “reasonably related.”48 This significantly broadened the scope of the safe harbor 
provision to include pre-clinical experiments used to develop new drugs, not just generics, if they 
are regularly submitted to the FDA to get approval.
49
  The Court also held that the safe harbor 
applies even when the experiments are not ultimately submitted to the FDA, as long as they are 
relevant to the submissions.
50
  This broad interpretation of the safe harbor provision protects “all 
uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any 
information under the FDCA.”51  Based on the Supreme Court’s apparent difficulty in 
interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision, there is clearly some ambiguity in the 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), as well as disparity between the legislative history and the 
plain language of the statute, which has led to uncertainty as to the true scope of the provision. 
D.  Recent Federal Circuit decisions regarding the “safe harbor” application to post-
FDA approval activities 
A major uncertainty that has arisen due to the ambiguity of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is 
whether the safe harbor applies to post-FDA approval activities.  The Supreme Court cases 
discussed above focus on only pre-approval activities, however, there have been two recent 
                                                            
47 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 202. 
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Federal Circuit cases addressing the post-approval issue.  Post-approval issues arise when the 
FDA requires the drug manufacturers to produce information even after the drug has been 
approved by the FDA.  These cases, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC and 
Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., seem to have contradicting opinions and used 
different methods of interpretation to reach the decisions.
52
   
In Classen v. Biogen, Classen alleged that Biogen and GlaxoSmithKline (collectively 
“Biogen”) infringed on their patent when those companies participated in studies linking the 
timing of childhood vaccines to the development of certain diseases, because Classen owned the 
patent to the methods used by Biogen.
53
  Classen argued that the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) safe 
harbor provision is limited to “activities conducted to obtain pre-marketing approval of generic 
counterparts of patented inventions, before patent expiration.”54  Biogen contended that their 
reporting to the FDA the results from the studies is within the safe harbor provision.
55
  Judge 
Rader and Judge Newman wrote the majority opinion.
56
  The majority agreed with Classen that 
the safe harbor provision “does not apply to information that may be routinely reported to the 
FDA long after marketing approval has been obtained.”57  In coming to their conclusion, the 
majority discussed the legislative history of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act).   The court cited from a House Report that the 
Act “provides that it is not an act of patent infringement for a generic drug maker to import or to 
test a patented drug in preparation for seeking FDA approval if marketing of the drug would 
                                                            
52 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
53 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
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occur after expiration of the patent.”58 The court argued that the House Report makes it clear that 
“the legislation concerns premarketing approval of generic drugs,” citing the report’s statement 
that “the information which can be developed under this provision is the type which is required 
to obtain approval of the drug.”59  “The Report states that ‘the generic manufacturer is not 
permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is 
test the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval.”60 
The dissent, written by Judge Moore, disagrees with the majority’s reliance on the 
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act to interpret the scope of the safe harbor provision.  
Judge Moore argues that the majority’s interpretation is “contrary to the plain language of the 
statute and Supreme Court precedent.”61   He suggests that by looking at the plain language, the 
statute does not limit the safe harbor to exclusively pre-FDA-approval.
62
  He relies on the 
Court’s decision in Merck, that “there is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain 
information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed or 
the particular submission in which it could be included … Congress exempted from infringement 
all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to the process of developing information for 
submission under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs.”63 
Moore suggests that the majority relies too heavily on the legislative history.  It is undisputed 
that the safe harbor covers pre-approval activity, but the legislative history does not address 
whether it covers more than that.  “The language Congress chose to enact and that was signed 
                                                            
58 659 F.3d 1057, 1071 citing H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15, 1894 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648 (1984). 
59 Id. at 1071. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1083. 
62 Id. 
63 659 F.3d, citing Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
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into law by the President is plain on its face.  There is no ‘pre-approval’ limitation.”64  Moore 
argues that the plain language of the statute is broader than the majority interpreted by basing 
their interpretation on the legislative history of the Act.
65
  He ultimately goes on to conclude that 
Biogen was not required by the FDA to perform the specific infringing studies, and “the general 
administration of drugs or vaccines is not reasonably related to post-approval reporting 
activities,” so the activities in question were not “reasonably related” to the submission of data to 
the FDA, so they are not protected under the safe harbor provision.
66
  Following this decision by 
the Federal Circuit, GlaxoSmithKline filed a petition for certiorari to have this decision reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
67 
The issue in Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc. is whether patented 
techniques used to test the bioequivalence of generic drugs to generate data required by the FDA 
after the drug has been approved is protected under the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1).
68
  The drug in question is a generic version of Lovenox (enoxaparin), which prevents 
blood clots.  This drug is made up of a unique set of molecules, creating complications when 
submitting an ANDA, given the difficulty establishing that the generic has the same active 
ingredients as the existing drug.
69
  The FDA provided criteria (or “standards for identity”) for 
generic manufacturers to show that generic enaxoparin has the same active ingredients as 
Lovenox, and it suggested multiple techniques for this testing.
70
  Amphastar filed an ANDA for 
generic enoxaparin in March 2003 and obtained FDA approval to market the drug in September 
                                                            
64 Id. at 1083. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1084. 
67 GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., No. 11-1078 (Feb. 28, 2012). 
68 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
69 Id. at 1350. 
70 Id. at 1350-51. 
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2011.
71
  Amphastar was the first company to file an ANDA for generic enoxaparin.
72
  
Subsequently, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Sandoz, Inc. (collectively “Momenta”) 
obtained FDA approval in July 2010 and were the first to actually bring the drug to the market.
73
  
Momenta patented the “methods for analyzing heterogeneous populations of polysaccharides … 
for the presence or amount of a non-naturally occurring sugar … that results from a method of 
making enoxaparin…”74 As the only generic on the market, Momenta’s sale of enoxaparin 
generated over a billion dollars per year, largely because of the lack of competition.
75
   Momenta 
alleged patent infringement because Amphastar used Momenta’s patented methods to analyze 
enoxaparin samples for manufacturing it for commercial sale.
76
  Amphastar argued that the 
alleged infringing testing is protected by the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor provision, or 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1).
77
   
The district court held that “the alleged infringing activity involves the use of plaintiffs’ 
patented quality control testing methods on each commercial batch of enoxaparin that will be 
sold after FDA approval” and concluded that the safe harbor does not apply.78 The court focused 
on the legislative history of the safe harbor provision and referenced the Classen decision 
(“although the safe harbor provision permits otherwise infringing activity that is conducted to 
obtain regulatory approval of a product, it does not permit a generic manufacturer to continue in 
that otherwise infringing activity after obtaining such approval.”)79  Amphastar appealed, 
arguing that the ruling construed the safe harbor provision too narrowly and suggested that the 
                                                            
71 Id. at 1351. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 686 F.3d 1348 citing United States Patent No. 7,575,886 col.4 II.53-55. 
75 Id. at 1351. 
76 Id. at 1352. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1353 citing J.A. 31. 
79 Id. at 1353. 
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plain language of the statute does not preclude post-FDA-approval activities.
80
  On appeal, 
Momenta used Classen to argue that the district court was correct.  “In Classen, this court 
squarely held that ‘[t]he [safe harbor] does not apply to information that may be routinely 
reported to the FDA long after marketing approval has been obtained.’”81  Momenta additionally 
argued that the FDA does not require the particular patented procedure, so the safe harbor should 
not apply because there are other acceptable testing methods available.
82
  
Judge Moore and Judge Dyk comprised the majority in the Momenta decision, while 
Judge Rader wrote a lengthy dissent.  Notably, Judge Moore wrote the dissent in Classen and 
Judge Rader wrote the majority opinion.  Here, the majority looked at the language of the statute 
to determine the scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor provision.
83
  The majority looked at the 
text of the safe harbor provision and did not find any ambiguity in that language after 
undertaking a plain language interpretation, stating that “Congress could not have been clearer in 
its choice of words: as long as the use of the patented invention is solely for uses ‘reasonably 
related’ to developing and submitting information pursuant to ‘a Federal law’ regulating the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs, it is not ‘an act of infringement.’”84   
The majority posits that although the provision was enacted in the context of the ANDA 
approval process, Congress used “flexible and expansive” language rather than specifically 
referencing the ANDA portion of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
85
  The majority asserts that 
if Congress had intended to provision to be limited to exclusively information submitted 
                                                            
80 686 F.3d 1348, 1353. 
81 Appellee’s Br. At 43 (quoting Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070, alterations made by Momenta). 
82 686 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
83 Id. at 1353-4. 
84 686 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
85 Id. 
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pursuant to the FDCA, it would have used more specific language to indicate that intention.
86
  In 
other places in the statute, there are limitations based on the FDCA that are expressly referenced, 
such as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), whereas there are no express references to the FDCA in the safe 
harbor provision.
87
  The majority stated that it “will not import the limitation of § 271(e)(2) into 
§ 271(e)(1)… The statute here applies to any use of a patented invention as long as the use is 
‘reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs…’”88 Comparing the inclusion of limitations in 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) to the lack of language indicating a limitation in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the 
majority interpreted Congress’ lack of a limitation in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to be intentional.89  
“When the intent of Congress is expressed so clearly and consistently throughout the statute, 
there is neither need nor the occasion to refer to the legislative history.”90  The majority insisted 
that the legislative history is irrelevant in determining the scope of the safe harbor provision, 
because Congress would have included language to limit the provision to pre-approval activities 
if it intended that the provision be so limited.
91
   
The scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor does not stop at activities reasonably relate 
to development of information submitted in an ANDA… [a]s long as the allegedly 
infringing use is ‘for uses reasonably related’ to the development and submission of that 
information it is not an act of infringement, regardless of where that requirement resides 
in the law.
92
    
The majority compares this interpretation to the Supreme Court cases addressed above, Eli Lilly 
v. Medtronic and Merck v. Integra, in which the Court relied on the statutory language rather 
than the legislative history to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  It specifically suggests that the 
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Court in Merck explicitly rejected the notion that the safe harbor was limited to “the activities 
necessary to seek approval of a generic drug.”93    
The majority ultimately determined that the information obtained by Amphastar using the 
patented technique is information “submitted” for purposes of the statute.94    In response to 
Momenta’s contention that the information obtained using the patented technique was not 
“submitted” to the FDA, “but rather was retained by the ANDA holder,” the majority concluded 
that the FDA requires that this type of information be retained by the manufacturer for each 
batch of the generic drug produced for one year, and the FDA has the authority to inspect those 
records at any time for continued approval.
95
  “We think that the requirement to maintain records 
for FDA inspection satisfies the requirement that the uses be reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information to the FDA… the fact that the FDA does not in most 
cases actually inspect the records does not change the fact that they are for the ‘development and 
submission of information under a federal law.’”96  The court cites Merck to support its 
conclusion that there is no infringement when “there [was] a reasonable basis for believing that 
the experiments [would] produce the types of information that are relevant to an IND or NDA” 
regardless of whether that information was actually submitted to the FDA.
97
  
The majority found it necessary to distinguish this case from the decision in Classen.  
The majority posits that the specific studies at issue in Classen were not mandated by the FDA, 
instead, only the information about adverse side effects acquired as a result of the studies (which 
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used the patented method) was required by the FDA.
98
  “This case, however, fits well within 
Classen because the information submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the 
ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug.  Here, the submissions are not ‘routine 
submissions’ to the FDA, but instead are submissions that are required to maintain FDA 
approval.”99  The majority asserts that:  
unlike Classen where the patented studies performed were not mandated by the FDA, the 
information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufacturer but is generated by 
FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated under penalty of law to follow… Under 
a proper construction of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the fact that Amphastar’s testing is carried 
out to ‘satisfy the FDA’s requirements means it falls within the scope of the safe harbor, 
even though the activity is carried out after approval… Unlike Classen, where the 
allegedly infringing activity ‘may’ have eventually led to an FDA submission, there is no 
dispute in this case that Amphastar’s allegedly infringing activities are carried out to 
‘satisfy the FDA’s requirements.’100    
The majority suggests that the court should not adopt the district court’s pre/post-approval 
distinction, and that “Classen did not turn on this artificial distinction” either.101   Additionally, 
the majority concludes that the safe harbor provision is not limited to situations where the 
patented invention is the only way to submit the information required by the FDA.  The safe 
harbor still applies even when there are non-infringing alternatives available to the generic 
manufacturer.
102
  
Judge Rader, in his lengthy dissent, disagrees with the majority’s expansive interpretation 
of the safe harbor provision, arguing that “this expansion of the law circumvents the purpose of 
the law and ignores the binding precedent of Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 
659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.Cir.2011).  Sadly this result will render worthless manufacturing test method 
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patents.”103  He asserts that the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) should rely on the 
legislative history of the Act, not the plain language of the statute.
104
  In his argument, he 
references Eli Lilly, where the Court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has observed that the text 
alone of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) can be ‘not plainly comprehensible.’”105  In support of his 
argument for using the legislative history to interpret the provision, Judge Rader refers to 
multiple legislative history materials, such as House Reports, statements and letters, and 
Congressional testimony, to show that the intended scope of the Act was limited to only pre-
approval testing necessary for FDA approval.
106
  “Nowhere in the legislative history can this 
court find any mention of the post-approval, continuous, commercial sales allowed by this 
decision.”107   He suggests that “[s]pecifically, § 271(e)(1) won approval because it was limited 
in time, quantity, and type,” and that “time” applies to exclusively pre-marketing approval.108  
He emphasizes that the authors of the Hatch-Waxman Act undoubtedly intended for the 
provision to be limited in these ways.  “In particular, the authors made clear that section 
271(e)(1) would not apply to commercial sales, i.e., the ‘infringing’ product would not enter the 
market until after the patent’s life.”109  Judge Rader himself was present during the drafting of 
this Act.  He insists that “[t]he authors of this section (and I hesitate to add that I was present 
through this legislative process) did not imagine that § 271(e)(1) would allow continuous, 
commercial infringing sales during any portion of the life of the patent.”110  Judge Rader 
suggests that the majority’s opinion is completely contrary to the Congress’ intent during the 
legislative process, and the way the majority “rewrites” the law will allow Amphastar to infringe 
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throughout the entire life of Momenta’s patent for commercial purposes, competing with 
Momenta.
111
  Judge Rader goes on to argue that the majority did not consider the word “solely” 
in its interpretation of the statute.
112
  He suggests that Amphastar uses the patented method for 
commercial purposes, not “solely” for developing and submitting information to the FDA.113  
 Judge Rader also disagrees with the majority’s interpretation of “submission.”114  He 
argues that “[m]aintaining or keeping a document has the exact opposite meaning of submitting a 
document.  In other words, ‘submission’ means not really submitting anything – a strange 
construction of an ‘unambiguous’ term.”115  Rader contends that the statutory language, as well 
as the legislative history of the statute make it clear that its intended scope is for pre-FDA-
approval activity only.  “Therefore, a reading of all the words in the statute and a reading of 
those words in light of their legislative history shows that § 271(e)(1) only permits a limited 
amount of pre-approval experiments to obtain FDA approval.”116  In his analysis, Judge Rader 
relies on the Classen decision and their use of the legislative history, as well as Supreme Court 
precedent.
117
   He fully rejects the majority’s effort to distinguish Classen, highlighting that 
Judge Moore’s dissent in Classen references the distinction between pre- and post-approval 
activities, although in her majority here, she insists that Classen does not distinguish in this 
way.
118
  Additionally, the parties and amici interpreted Classen to distinguish pre- and post-
approval activities.
119
  He also expresses his disapproval of the majority’s characterization of 
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activities mandated or not mandated by the FDA.
120
  Lastly, Judge Rader asserts that the 
Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly and Merck decisions support the Classen decision, not the majority’s 
opinion in this case.
121
  Those cases dealt only with pre-approval activity and submissions, and 
the majority “takes phrases from those opinions out of context to allege that its new 
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is consistent with those cases.”122    
After the Federal Circuit decided Momenta in August, Momenta filed a Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc.  Momenta argued that the panel decision in Momenta is contrary to the 
Classen decision.
123
  Momenta suggested that “[t]he panel’s interpretation expands Section 
271(e)(1)’s safe harbor into a safe ocean,” and “nothing in the text or purpose of Section 
271(e)(1) warrants the panel’s expansive reading.”124  The petition highlighted the 
inconsistencies between the Classen and Momenta decisions and relied on Judge Rader’s 
arguments in Momenta’s dissent.125  In addition, Momenta’s petition detailed the implications of 
having uncertainty as to the scope of the safe harbor provision, making it necessary for the court 
to resolve the inconsistency.
126
   In September, shortly after Momenta filed this petition, Classen 
Immunotherapies submitted a brief of amicus curiae in support of Momenta’s petition for 
rehearing en banc.  
127
  In it’s brief, Classen urged the Federal Circuit to reevaluate the outcome 
in Momenta by suggesting that the outcome was in “direct and irreconcilable conflict with the 
decision” in Classen and by discussing the impact it will have on whether the Supreme Court 
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grants certiorari in the Classen case.
128
  Classen insisted “the two decisions cannot logically 
coexist, because Section 271(e)(1) cannot simultaneously be restricted to protecting only pre-
marketing uses of patented invention as it was written, and also be expanded to protect some 
post-marketing activities.”129  Classen argued that the effect of the Momenta decision is contrary 
to the purpose of patent laws.
130
  Despite Momenta’s petition and Classen’s amicus brief urging 
the Federal Circuit to reevaluate the panel’s decision in Momenta, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc on November 20, 2012.
131
  
As mentioned above, GlaxoSmithKline filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Classen.132  In December, the United States 
submitted an amicus brief discouraging the Supreme Court from granting the petition for 
certiorari.
133
  Although the United States expressed its view that the Federal Circuit erred in the 
Classen decision, the United States concludes that “there is no longer any practical need for this 
Court’s intervention in light of the Federal Circuit’s subsequent decision in Momenta 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.”134  The brief details the reasons the 
Federal Circuit’s Momenta decision came out correctly.  The United States suggests that  
Congress not only contemplated that drug manufacturers would conduct post-approval 
scientific studies and clinical trials, but specifically authorized the FDA to require such 
studies in a variety of circumstances.  If such post-approval studies involve the use of 
patented inventions solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission 
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of information to the FDA, the plain language of Section 271(e)(1) precludes any claim 
for patent infringement.
135
   
 
The United States’ reasoning primarily relies on the plain language interpretation of the safe 
harbor provision, noting that “nothing in the language of the statute links the availability of 
Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to the timing of FDA marketing approval.”136  The brief 
addressed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Merck and Eli Lilly and determined that those 
decisions do not allow the court of appeals to conclude that the safe harbor only protects pre-
approval activity.
137
   Despite the United States’ in-depth reasoning about why the Federal 
Circuit came to the wrong conclusion in Classen, the United States ultimately determined that 
there is no need for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari given the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Momenta, and accepted Momenta’s narrow interpretation of Classen.  On January 14, 2013 the 
Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition for certiorari.
138
  
III. ANALYSIS 
The inconsistent decisions in Classen and Momenta have created an intra-circuit split 
within the Federal Circuit.  The two cases are far too similar for the different outcomes they 
generated.  Although the majority in Momenta briefly attempts to distinguish it from the Classen 
decision, this was a weak attempt and is addressed in only a few sentences.  The majority 
suggests that its decision in Momenta fits within a narrowly construed Classen opinion.  The 
majority argues that “the submissions are not “routine submissions” to the FDA, but instead are 
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submissions that are required to maintain FDA approval.”139  It also highlights that “unlike 
Classen where the patented studies performed were not mandated by the FDA, the information 
here is not generated voluntarily by the manufacturer but is generated by FDA requirements the 
manufacturer is obligated under penalty of law to follow.  Under such circumstances, the 
information can be said to have been gathered solely for submission to the FDA and not, as in 
Classen, primarily for non-FDA purposes…”140 
Judge Rader disagrees with this reasoning in his dissent, stating that this decision 
“ignores the binding precedent of Classen.”141  Judge Rader, who wrote the majority opinion in 
Classen, makes it incredibly clear in his dissent that he does not think the Momenta decision can 
be reconciled with the outcome in Classen.
142
  There is clearly some inconsistency with the 
court’s decisions.  In addition, Judge Rader himself was involved in the drafting of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  He witnessed firsthand the discussions addressing the purposes of the Act and 
was aware of Congress’ intentions regarding it.  Judge Rader argues that the court should 
primarily use the legislative history to interpret the scope of the safe harbor provision, which he 
did in Classen, and that the majority in Momenta was wrong for not considering it in their 
interpretation.
143
  The legislative history clearly suggests that the scope of the safe harbor 
provision was intended to be very limited in time and scope.  The purpose of the provision is to 
facilitate the lengthy FDA approval process for generic manufacturers.  The safe harbor 
provision is included in the statute so that generic drugs can obtain FDA approval faster and 
more easily, which suggests that the scope should be limited to activities before the drug obtains 
approval from the FDA.   
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The core of the issue lies in how the court should go about interpreting the statute.  
Courts generally look first at the plain language of the statute to interpret its meaning.
144
  If there 
are no ambiguities in the wording of the text, the courts construe the meaning of the statute 
simply by looking at the language used.
145
  However, if the court finds that there are ambiguities 
in the plain language of the statute, the court will usually look to sources outside the text of the 
statute itself, such as the legislative history, to determine what Congress intended the statute to  
mean.
146
  Here, the Classen majority found that there was ambiguity in the text of Section 
271(e)(1).
147
  The words “solely,” “reasonably related,” “development and submission” and 
“federal law which regulates… drugs” are terms that the Classen court argued were ambiguous 
and could not be interpreted simply by looking exclusively at the words of the statute.
148
  For this 
reason, the court found it necessary to look into the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
in order to better determine what Congress intended those words to mean in the context of the 
statute.
149
  As discussed above, when the legislative history is taken into consideration, it seems 
clear that Congress intended Section 271(e)(1) to be limited to information submitted to the FDA 
in order to obtain FDA approval, and was not intended to cover infringing activities after the 
drug gained approval.  In this respect, Classen interpreted the statute correctly.   
In contrast, the Momenta majority bases their decision on the opinion that the plain 
language of Section 271(e)(1) is clear and unambiguous, and therefore the legislative history 
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should not be taken into account.
150
  This majority argued that the legislature carefully picked the 
words used in the statute and intentionally left out a pre- and post-approval distinction.  If the 
majority is correct that the statutory text is unambiguous, their method of interpretation is also 
correct.  Looking solely at the plain language of the statute, in conjunction with later provisions 
in the Act, it is reasonable that the statute can be interpreted as including any information kept by 
the drug manufacturer for submission to the FDA, even if that submission would occur after the 
drug was approved, and even if the FDA does not actually mandate that the information be 
submitted.  The words in the statute say nothing about the time frame of the submissions and do 
not limit the scope of the submissions to be requirements under the FDCA.  Therefore, without 
looking into the Congressional intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the safe harbor does not appear 
to be limited to pre-FDA-approval activities. 
It then becomes an issue of which Federal Circuit panel used the correct statutory 
interpretation method in this circumstance.  This depends on whether the language in the statute 
is ambiguous.  Two panels of the Federal Circuit came to two almost completely different 
conclusions as to whether the safe harbor provision applies to post-approval activities.  The 
panels looked at the exact same language in Section 271(e)(1), yet one determined that it does 
not include post-approval activities, while the other argues that it clearly does.  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has had to interpret language in Section 271(e)(1) multiple times.  A statute that 
has created so many differences in interpretation, regardless of the methods courts have used to 
interpret it, would seem to be somewhat ambiguous.  The legislative history should be an 
important tool to interpret what Congress intended the statute to mean.   
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 Without considering the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Momenta 
interprets the scope of the safe harbor provision too broadly.  The majority used only the plain 
text of the provision to analyze its meaning, without taking any of the legislative intent or history 
into account.
151
  Momenta’s approach to interpreting the scope of the safe harbor so broadly 
creates major implications for the pharmaceutical industry.  Allowing the safe harbor to extend 
to infringing activities after the drug has been approved by the FDA may even extend farther 
than simply post-approval analytic testing to commercial uses.  It would decrease the incentive 
for brand-name pharmaceuticals to invest time and money into research and development of new 
drugs.  The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to strike a balance by increasing the market 
for generics at cheaper prices while still leaving brand-name pharmaceutical companies with 
incentives to invest in research and development of new drugs.  There is a fine line to 
maintaining this balance, and a broad interpretation of the scope of the safe harbor would skew 
in favor of generic manufacturers.  This would disrupt the balance, especially if generic 
companies could infringe on patents for producing their drug for commercial purposes.  
Although a broad interpretation of the scope of the safe harbor provision would disrupt the 
balance sought by the creators of the Hatch-Waxman Act, an extremely narrow scope would also 
disrupt that balance and would make it a difficult and slow process to get generics on the market, 
which would likely increase their costs.  When interpreting the scope of the safe harbor 
provision, the courts need to be mindful of the underlying purposes of the Act.   
 The conflicting outcomes in Classen and Momenta create uncertainty within the 
pharmaceutical industry, and makes the need for a more bright line interpretation of the scope of 
the safe harbor provision more apparent.  This uncertainty as to what activities covered under the 
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safe harbor is difficult for both the pioneer and generic manufacturers.  Generic manufacturers 
will not know if they are able to use patented techniques to submit information to the FDA after 
their ANDA has been approved.  Pioneer drug manufacturers will be hesitant to invest in 
developing techniques that may be used freely by generic manufacturers for commercial use, 
which will compete with their own drugs throughout the life of the patent.  When the statute is 
interpreted in light of the legislative history, it seems apparent that the safe harbor provision does 
not extend to post-FDA approval activities, however the plain language of the statute, taken 
without consideration of the legislature’s intent, allows for a reasonably broader interpretation of 
the safe harbor provision because nothing in the statute explicitly prohibits its application to 
post-FDA-approval activities.  As is apparent from the Merck and Eli Lilly cases, even the 
Supreme Court has struggled with how far the safe harbor extends.
152
  If the plain language of 
the provision were completely unambiguous, the courts would not be struggling as they to 
interpret the scope.  As mentioned above, this uncertainty will cause brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to be wary of investing large amounts of time and money on developing 
techniques that will be used by generic manufacturers for commercial purposes after the drug is 
approved by the FDA.   
A resolution to this uncertainty is essential for the balance between patent protection and 
ability for generics to enter the market.  This issue can be resolved by a Supreme Court decision 
that explicitly draws a distinction between pre- and post-FDA-approval activities and makes it 
clear whether or not they are covered under the safe harbor provision.  Alternatively (or 
additionally), the legislature can address the ambiguity in the wording of the statute. A third 
option is action by the FDA itself.  The FDA could create guidelines allowing or disallowing the 
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safe harbor to apply to post-approval activities.  There are multiple routes available to resolve the 
ambiguous scope of the safe harbor. 
A Supreme Court decision addressing the scope of the safe harbor provision would 
provide precedent for courts to follow in future infringement cases and would create uniformity 
in those decisions.  Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Classen, it has another 
chance to resolve the issue by accepting Momenta’s recent petition for certiorari.  In it’s petition, 
Momenta stresses how important it is that the Supreme Court clarify the scope of the safe harbor 
provision.  It is possible that the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Classen because it 
anticipated a petition after the Momenta decision and decided this would be a better opportunity 
to address the issue.  If the Court accepts the petition for certiorari, this would be the most 
immediate solution to the intra-circuit split.  Once the Supreme Court addresses the scope of the 
safe harbor provision and settles on whether it applies to post-FDA-approval activities, the 
uncertainty created by the intra-circuit split will be eliminated.  The courts below, including the 
split Federal Circuit, will have guidance in deciding future post-approval infringement cases.  
This will postpone or eliminate the need for the legislature to amend the wording of the statute or 
for the FDA to create guidelines.  A Supreme Court decision clarifying the scope of the safe 
harbor provision will be the fastest and most efficient way to provide more certainty for the 
pharmaceutical industry by allowing manufacturers to predict the outcome of future infringement 
cases. 
If the Supreme Court denies Momenta’s petition for certiorari, the legislature might need 
to address the issue by altering the text of the safe harbor provision.  Clearly there have been 
issues interpreting the meaning of certain terms and phrases in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) regarding 
both pre- and post-approval activities.  The courts have not always taken the legislative history 
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and intent into account in their decisions, so the legislature may need to decide what the scope of 
the provision should be and alter the language to make their intent more clear.  Specifically, the 
legislature might choose re-write the statute to explicitly state whether or not it applies to post-
FDA-approval activities.  The uncertainty seems to lie in the wording “solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information,”153 so that is what Congress should 
focus on clarifying.  Congress could clarify by adding text explicitly saying that this applies only 
to pre-approval activities or that it applies to any activities used to submit information to the 
FDA.  Alternatively, Congress could add an extra sentence following the provision to make it 
apparent whether or not the safe harbor applies to post-approval activities in addition to pre-
approval activities.  This solution would provide clarity for the pharmaceutical industry, however 
it would be a lengthy process and would not provide an immediate solution to the problem.   
Lastly, the FDA could write guidelines to clarify whether the scope of the safe harbor 
encompasses post-FDA-approval activities.  The FDA creates guidance documents for different 
areas of the food and drug laws that the FDA regulates.  These guidelines do not have a binding 
effect, however reviewing courts will give them deference because it is such a technical area.  
The FDA already has a category of guidance documents for generics, so it could easily assess 
whether the pharmaceutical industry should be guided in a particular direction regarding the 
scope of the safe harbor provision and add a guidance document discussing the suggested 
interpretation.  Although these guidelines would not be binding on the pharmaceutical industry, 
it would provide helpful guidance for pharmaceutical companies uncertain of whether the safe 
harbor applies to post-FDA-approval activities.  Pharmaceutical manufacturers will most likely 
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follow these guidelines, knowing that courts will give deference to them.  This would be a short-
term solution if the courts are unable to resolve the problem in the near future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The conflicting Classen and Momenta decisions have emphasized the struggle the courts 
are facing interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision.  These two cases have made it clear 
that scope of the safe harbor depends largely on whether the court relies on the plain language of 
the statute (resulting in a broad interpretation) or the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act (leading to a much narrower interpretation).  Classen and Momenta each address whether the 
safe harbor extends to post-FDA-approval activities, however the Federal Circuit used the 
legislative history approach in Classen but the plain language approach in Momenta, leading to 
essentially opposite outcomes.  These two decisions have created uncertainty as to the scope of 
the safe harbor and whether it applies to post-FDA-approval activities, highlighting the need for 
a more bright-line interpretation.  This is likely to create major problems in the pharmaceutical 
industry, leading brand-name manufacturers to be wary of spending large sums of money on 
research and development of new drugs, and generic manufacturers will be unsure of what 
constitutes infringement.  Ideally, the Supreme Court will clarify the scope of the safe harbor 
provision by accepting Momenta’s petition for certiorari.  If the Court refuses to address the 
issue, the legislature will need to alter the wording in the statute to clarify the scope or the FDA 
can create guidelines.  Ultimately, the scope of the safe harbor provision will need to be clarified 
in order to avoid the negative consequences that this uncertainty will create in the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
